'Special' Pentagon Unit Skirted CIA on Iraq

Wednesday, 10 March 2004 00:48 by: Anonymous

    Spy Unit Skirted CIA on Iraq
    By Greg Miller
    The Los Angeles Times

    Wednesday 10 March 2004

Pentagon group's role in shaping White House views about ties between Hussein and Al Qaeda was greater than known, Senate panel hears.

     WASHINGTON A special intelligence unit at the Pentagon privately briefed senior officials at the White House on alleged ties between Iraq and Al Qaeda without the knowledge of CIA Director George J. Tenet, according to new information presented at a Senate hearing Tuesday.

     The disclosure suggests that the controversial Pentagon office played a greater role than previously understood in shaping the administration's views on Iraq's alleged ties to the terrorist network behind the Sept. 11 attacks, and bypassed usual channels to make a case that conflicted with the conclusions of CIA analysts.

     Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Tenet said he was unaware until recently that the Pentagon unit had presented its findings to the offices of Vice President Dick Cheney and national security advisor Condoleezza Rice. It is not clear whether Cheney or Rice were present for the briefing, which was mentioned in a Defense Department letter released by the Armed Services Committee on Tuesday.

     In a wide-ranging hearing, Tenet said violence in Iraq was on the upswing, but that he thought there was a "low probability" that strife would prevent the United States from handing authority to an interim Iraqi government on July 1.

     Although the hearing was billed as a session to discuss international security concerns, it was marked by heated exchanges reflecting the political tensions over the Iraq war and the failure to find weapons the Bush administration cited as the principal reason for last year's U.S.-led war.

     Tenet came under sharp attack from Democrats, who called the prewar intelligence a "fiasco," pointed to what they said were disturbing disparities between classified CIA estimates and more alarming versions released to the public before the war, and criticized the CIA director for saying recently that the agency never portrayed Iraq as an imminent threat.

     "The fact that the intelligence assessments before the war were so wildly off the mark should trouble all Americans," said Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.), the ranking Democrat on the committee.

     It was under questioning from Levin that Tenet acknowledged that he did not know until within the last few weeks that a special Pentagon intelligence analysis unit had briefed the White House on ties between Iraq and Al Qaeda.

     "I did not know that at the time, and I think I first learned about this at [a congressional] hearing last week," Tenet said. A U.S. intelligence official said Tenet first learned of the White House briefing Feb. 24 during a closed hearing before the Senate Intelligence Committee.

     The Pentagon unit was created by Douglas J. Feith, undersecretary of Defense for policy, after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on New York and the Pentagon. The unit was a handful of intelligence analysts, Feith has said, and was established to examine state sponsorship of terrorism, but is principally known for its efforts to assemble evidence linking Iraq to Al Qaeda.

     It has been reported previously that the so-called Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group presented its findings to the CIA in August 2002. But in a letter to Warner released Tuesday for the first time, Feith said the group's briefing "was also given to National Security Council and Office of Vice President staff members."

     Levin asked Tenet whether it was "standard operating procedure" for intelligence analysis to be presented to the White House without his involvement.

     "I don't know," Tenet replied. "I've never been in the situation."

     Tenet emphasized that he briefed President Bush personally almost daily, and that his was "the definitive view about these subjects."

     "I know you feel that way," Levin replied, making it clear he wasn't convinced.

     Levin said the committee had obtained copies of the Pentagon group's written briefing material, and that the version presented to the White House included material omitted from the briefing for the CIA. He declined to elaborate, saying the documents were classified.

     A government official familiar with the briefings said the presentation for the White House included a slide sharply critical of the CIA for failing to recognize evidence pointing toward collaboration between Iraq and Al Qaeda. That slide was excluded from the briefing at CIA headquarters at Langley, Va.

     The government official said those briefed at the White House included the staff of Stephen Hadley, the deputy national security advisor, and I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, the vice president's chief of staff.

     The Pentagon intelligence group was disbanded before the war, but remains under scrutiny because of its controversial mission and role.

     Critics say it sifted through years of intelligence reports on Iraq, seizing on shards that supported the contention that there was collaboration between Iraq and Al Qaeda, and then funneling the information to senior policymakers to help bolster the case for war. Pentagon officials reject that characterization.

     Many of the group's findings have been disputed by the CIA and other agencies, who say there is a history of contacts between Iraq and Al Qaeda but no evidence of an operational relationship. But administration officials continue to cling to the theme, and polls show many Americans believe that Iraq was involved in the Sept. 11 attacks.

     In January, Cheney said "there's overwhelming evidence there was a connection between Al Qaeda and the Iraqi government." Cheney has touted the work of the Pentagon group, saying a Feith memo that lists Iraq-Al Qaeda connections and was leaked to the media is the "best source" on the subject.

     Tenet said Tuesday that the CIA "did not agree with the way the data was characterized in that document," and that he intended to contact Cheney to caution him about its conclusions. "I learned about [Cheney's] quote last night when I was preparing for this hearing," Tenet said. "And I will talk to him about it."

     Some lawmakers said that if Tenet did not believe Iraq was an imminent threat as he said in a recent speech at Georgetown University he should have done more to challenge the prewar assertions by Bush and others casting Hussein's regime as a danger that required immediate military intervention.

     "You can't have it both ways, can you, Mr. Tenet?" said Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.). "You can't on the one hand just say look, we never said that war was imminent, and then have this superheated dialogue and rhetoric [from the White House] and tell us here before the committee that you have no obligation to correct it or didn't even try."

     Tenet shot back: "I'm not going to sit here today and tell you what I did or what I didn't do, except that you have the confidence to know that when I believed that somebody was misconstruing intelligence I said something about it."

     Kennedy then asked Tenet whether he believed the administration "misrepresented the facts to justify the war." Tenet responded, "No, sir, I don't."

     Dissecting a key prewar intelligence estimate on Iraq's weapons program, Levin cited a number of cases in which he said the CIA or the administration hardened its language or dropped caveats to bolster the case for war. A declassified version of the report warned that Iraq's alleged weapons stocks could be used "against the U.S. homeland," language he said was missing from the classified text.

     In another example, Levin cited the CIA's assessment in its classified analysis that Iraq would supply weapons to Al Qaeda only under "desperate" or "extreme" circumstances, qualifiers missing from the public version of the report.

     Democrats attacked Tenet for allowing recent statements by administration officials to go unchallenged. Cheney, in particular, has reiterated claims that the intelligence community has backed away from, including comments suggesting Iraq might have been complicit in the Sept. 11 attacks, and that Iraqi trailers seized by American forces are "conclusive" evidence that Iraq had banned weapons.

     Urged by Levin to be more swift and assertive in correcting public statements by White House officials, Tenet said, "Sir, it's a fair point."

     Republicans on the committee accused Democrats of using the hearing to score political points against the Bush administration as the presidential election is heating up.

     Some Republicans defended Tenet, and said he should not have to answer for the prewar claims made by policymakers. The CIA director "is not their keeper," said Sen. John Warner (R-Va.), the chairman of the committee.

     Even Republicans who were not involved in the hearing reacted to Democrats' criticisms. One, Rep. Porter Goss (R-Fla.), the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, in a television interview called Kennedy and Levin "two old attack dogs gumming their way through artificial outrage about something they should know a lot more about and be more responsible about."

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    C.I.A. Chief Says He's Corrected Cheney Privately
    By Douglas Jehl
    The New York Times

    Wednesday 10 March 2004

     WASHINGTON, March 9 George J. Tenet, the director of central intelligence, told a Senate committee on Tuesday that he had privately intervened on several occasions to correct what he regarded as public misstatements on intelligence by Vice President Dick Cheney and others, and that he would do so again.

     "When I believed that someone was misconstruing intelligence, I said something about it," he said.

     Mr. Tenet identified three instances in which he had already corrected public statements by President Bush or Mr. Cheney or would do so, but he left the impression that there had been more.

     His comments, in testimony before the Armed Services Committee, came under sharp questioning from some Democrats on the panel, who have criticized him and the White House over prewar intelligence on Iraq. He insisted that he had honored his obligation to play a neutral role as the top intelligence adviser.

     In response to a question, he said he did not think the administration had misrepresented facts to justify going to war.

     Mr. Tenet said he planned to call Mr. Cheney's attention to a recent misstatement, in a Jan. 9 interview, when the vice president recommended as "your best source of information" on links between Iraq and Al Qaeda the contents of a disputed memorandum by a senior Pentagon official, Douglas J. Feith.

     That memorandum, sent last October to the Senate Intelligence Committee, portrayed what was presented as conclusive evidence of collaboration between Saddam Hussein's government and Al Qaeda, but it was never endorsed by intelligence agencies, who objected to Mr. Feith's findings.

     Mr. Tenet said he was not aware of Mr. Cheney's comments in that interview, published in The Rocky Mountain News, until Monday night.

     In his annual testimony before the committee on threats facing the United States, Mr. Tenet found himself drawn again into the dispute over whether intelligence agencies or policy makers were more to blame for misjudgments and overstatements about Iraq and whether Baghdad had ties to terrorism.

     In his testimony, Mr. Tenet hinted at private disputes with policy makers. He disclosed that he had not learned until last week about a highly unusual briefing given in August 2002 by colleagues of Mr. Feith, the under secretary of defense for policy, to senior aides of Mr. Cheney and Mr. Bush. The briefing outlined evidence of ties between Iraq and Al Qaeda, contradicting the C.I.A.'s view that such links could not be verified.

     According to government officials who have seen copies of the briefing documents, the information was presented to Stephen Hadley, the deputy national security adviser, and I. Lewis Libby, Mr. Cheney's chief of staff, and included slides that were strongly disparaging of C.I.A. analyses.

     The other two instances in which Mr. Tenet said he had acted to correct administration statements involved the State of the Union address in January 2002, when he objected after the fact to Mr. Bush's inclusion of disputed intelligence about Iraq's seeking to obtain uranium from Africa, and a Jan. 22 radio interview in which Mr. Cheney portrayed trailers found in Iraq as being for biological weapons, and thus "conclusive evidence" that Iraq "did in fact have programs for weapons of mass destruction."

     That was the conclusion initially reached by American intelligence agencies last spring, and it is still on the C.I.A.'s Web site. But it has been disputed since last summer within intelligence agencies, and Mr. Tenet said he had told Mr. Cheney there was "no consensus" among American analysts, with those at the Defense Intelligence Agency in particular arguing that the trailers were for producing hydrogen.

     A spokesman for Mr. Cheney, Kevin Kellems, declined to characterize the content of the conversation between Mr. Tenet and Mr. Cheney about the Jan. 22 interview. "It was a private conversation," he said.

     An administration official said, "Critics of the administration are misrepresenting what the vice president said in both of those interviews," and added, "I'm going to let the full text of those interviews speak for themselves."

     Mr. Tenet has acknowledged that intelligence agencies may have made misjudgments in their prewar assessments of Iraq, which expressed certainty that Mr. Hussein's government possessed chemical and biological weapons and was reconstituting its nuclear program. In the year since the American invasion, no evidence has been found, though Mr. Tenet insisted again on Tuesday that it was too soon to draw firm conclusions about the extent to which intelligence agencies erred.

     At the same time, as director of central intelligence, Mr. Tenet, who has been in his post since he was appointed by President Clinton in 1997, is widely seen as having the responsibility to prevent intelligence from being distorted for political purposes, and he seemed intent on defending himself and his agencies in that regard.

     Still, he walked a careful line in his answers, and nothing in his comments seemed to suggest that he was walking away from the administration. He has promised President Bush that he will serve at least through this year.

     Among the senators who pressed him hardest were two Democrats, Carl Levin of Michigan and Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts, who has been an early and active ally of Senator John Kerry, the front-runner for the Democratic presidential nomination.

     Mr. Kennedy asked Mr. Tenet if he believed the administration had misrepresented information about Iraq to justify war, to which Mr. Tenet responded, "No, sir, I don't."

     When asked whether he had sought to correct certain administration statements, including some that portrayed Iraq's arsenal as carrying the danger of a "mushroom cloud," he said, "I'm not going to sit here today and tell you what my interaction was and what I did or what I didn't do." But he added: "You have the confidence to know that when I believed that somebody was misconstruing intelligence, I said something about it. I don't stand up in public and do it. I do my job the way I did it in two administrations.

     "And policy makers you know, this is a tough road. Policy makers take data. They interpret threat. They assess risk. They put urgency behind it, and sometimes it doesn't uniquely comport with every word of an intelligence estimate."

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