Wednesday, 01 October 2014 / TRUTH-OUT.ORG

How Richard Nixon Sabotaged 1968 Vietnam Peace Talks to Get Elected President

Friday, 18 January 2013 10:01 By Robert Parry, Truthout | Book Excerpt

(Image: The Media Consortium)(Image: The Media Consortium)Journalist Robert Parry, editor of Consortiumnews.com, may be the most knowledgeable journalist about the GOP use of foreign policy subterfuge (some might call it treason) to successfully win the 1968 and 1980 elections. He has compiled the evidence in his latest book, "America's Stolen Narrative."

It is a persuasive account of the beginning of de facto stolen presidential elections by the GOP, which in turn has led to a lack of accountability for executive branch actions by the DC code of silence among the powerful. These elections (with the exception of Watergate) taught the Republicans, Parry contends, that there would be no consequences for law-breaking behavior in elections and foreign policy.

You can get the compelling America's Stolen Narrative with a minimum contribution to Truthout. Just click here

The following passages from the book explore the 1968 Nixon campaign efforts to prevent peace in Vietnam in order to help him narrowly be elected president.

Possibly the most notorious "October Surprise" case – and the first of this modern era – occurred in fall 1968 when Republican Richard Nixon was locked in a tight presidential race with Democratic nominee, Vice President Hubert Humphrey, and President Johnson was making progress in Vietnam peace negotiations.

At that point, a half million American soldiers were in the war zone and more than 30,000 had already died, along with Vietnamese dead estimated at about one million. In late October 1968, Johnson saw a chance for a breakthrough that would involve a bombing halt of North Vietnam and a possible framework for peace.

However, Johnson encountered surprising resistance from U.S. allies in South Vietnam. President Nguyen van Thieu was suddenly laying down obstacles to a possible settlement in the Paris peace talks.

On Oct. 29, 1968, Johnson got his first clear indication as to why. According to declassified records at the LBJ Library in Austin, Texas, Eugene Rostow, Johnson's Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, got a tip from Wall Street financier Alexander Sachs who said that one of Nixon's closest financial backers was describing Nixon's plan to "block" a peace settlement.

Nixon's backer was sharing this information at a working lunch with his banking colleagues in the context of helping them place their bets on stocks and bonds. In other words, the investment bankers were colluding over how to make money with their inside knowledge of Nixon's scheme to extend the Vietnam War.

Eugene Rostow passed on the information to his brother, Walt W. Rostow, Johnson's national security adviser. Eugene Rostow also wrote a memo about the tip. "The conversation was in the context of a professional discussion about the future of the financial markets in the near term," he wrote. "The speaker said he thought the prospects for a bombing halt or a cease-fire were dim, because Nixon was playing the problem ... to block. ... They would incite Saigon to be difficult, and Hanoi to wait."

In a later memo providing a chronology of the affair, Walt Rostow said he got the news about the Wall Street lunch from his brother shortly before attending a morning meeting at which President Johnson was informed by U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker about "Thieu's sudden intransigence."

You can get the compelling America's Stolen Narrative with a minimum contribution to Truthout. Just click here

Walt Rostow said "the diplomatic information previously received plus the information from New York took on new and serious significance," leading Johnson to order an FBI investigation that soon uncovered the framework of Nixon's blocking operation.

From the FBI wiretaps, Johnson quickly learned about the role of Nixon campaign official (and right-wing China Lobby figure) Anna Chennault contacting South Vietnam's Ambassador to the United States Bui Diem regarding the political importance for President Thieu's continued boycott of the Paris peace talks.

Nixon's 'Treason'

After reading these secret FBI cables, Johnson began working the phones to counter the Nixon campaign's gambit. According to recordings of the phone calls that have since been declassified, Johnson complained to Senate Republican Leader Everett Dirksen about the subterfuge.

On Nov. 2, just three days before the election, an angry Johnson telephoned Dirksen at 9:18 p.m., to provide details about Nixon's activities and to urge Dirksen to intervene forcefully.

"The agent [Chennault] says she's just talked to the boss in New Mexico and that he said that you [South Vietnam] must hold out, just hold on until after the election," Johnson said. "We know what Thieu is saying to them out there. We're pretty well informed at both ends." [Johnson believed "the boss in New Mexico" was Nixon's running mate, Spiro Agnew, who was there on a campaign trip.]

Johnson then injected a thinly veiled threat to go public. "I don't want to get this in the campaign," Johnson said, adding: "They oughtn't be doing this. This is treason."

Dirksen responded, "I know."

Johnson continued: "I think it would shock America if a principal candidate was playing with a source like this on a matter of this importance. I don't want to do that [go public]. They ought to know that we know what they're doing. I know who they're talking to. I know what they're saying."

Dirksen: "I better get in touch with him [Nixon], I think."

"They're contacting a foreign power in the middle of a war," Johnson said. "It's a damn bad mistake. And I don't want to say so. ... You just tell them that their people are messing around in this thing, and if they don't want it on the front pages, they better quit it."

After hearing from Dirksen, Nixon grew concerned that Johnson might just go public with his evidence of the conspiracy. At 1:54 p.m. on Nov. 3, trying to head off that possibility, Nixon spoke directly to Johnson, according to an audiotape released by the LBJ Library.

Nixon: "I just wanted you to know that I got a report from Everett Dirksen with regard to your call. ... I just went on 'Meet the Press' and I said ... that I had given you my personal assurance that I would do everything possible to cooperate both before the election and, if elected, after the election and if you felt ... that anything would be useful that I could do, that I would do it, that I felt Saigon should come to the conference table. ...

"I feel very, very strongly about this. Any rumblings around about somebody trying to sabotage the Saigon government's attitude, there's absolutely no credibility as far as I'm concerned."

Armed with FBI reports and other intelligence, Johnson responded, "I'm very happy to hear that, Dick, because that is taking place. Here's the history of it. I didn't want to call you but I wanted you to know what happened."

Johnson recounted some of the chronology leading up to Oct. 28, 1968, when it appeared that South Vietnam was onboard for the peace talks. He added: "Then the traffic goes out that Nixon will do better by you. Now that goes to Thieu. I didn't say with your knowledge. I hope it wasn't."

"Huh, no," Nixon responded. "My God, I would never do anything to encourage ... Saigon not to come to the table. ... Good God, we want them over to Paris, we got to get them to Paris or you can't have a peace. ... The war apparently now is about where it could be brought to an end. The quicker the better. To hell with the political credit, believe me."

Johnson, however, sounded less than convinced. "You just see that your people don't tell the South Vietnamese that they're going to get a better deal out of the United States government than a conference," the President said.

An Almost Scoop

After the conversation with Nixon, Johnson continued to consider whether he should go public with Nixon's "treason." A last-minute opportunity arose when a Christian Science Monitor correspondent in Saigon, Beverly Deepe, got word from South Vietnamese sources about the pressure on Thieu from the Nixon campaign to block the peace talks.

Deepe's story draft read: "Purported political encouragement from the Richard Nixon camp was a significant factor in the last-minute decision of President Thieu's refusal to send a delegation to the Paris peace talks – at least until the American Presidential election is over."

So, on Nov. 4, journalist Saville Davis from the Monitor's Washington bureau checked out Deepe's story with South Vietnamese Ambassador Bui Diem and with the White House. Bui Diem knocked the story down and the decision by the White House on whether to confirm the story went to President Johnson himself.

In a conference call, Johnson consulted with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Defense Secretary Clark Clifford and Walt Rostow. All three advisers recommended against going public, mostly out of fear that the scandalous information might reflect badly on the U.S. Government.

"Some elements of the story are so shocking in their nature that I'm wondering whether it would be good for the country to disclose the story and then possibly have a certain individual [Nixon] elected," Clifford said. "It could cast his whole administration under such doubt that I think it would be inimical to our country's interests."

Johnson concurred with the judgment, and an administration spokesman told Davis, "Obviously I'm not going to get into this kind of thing in any way, shape or form," according to an "eyes only" cable that Rostow sent Johnson. The cable added:

"Saville Davis volunteered that his newspaper would certainly not print the story in the form in which it was filed; but they might print a story which said Thieu, on his own, decided to hold out until after the election. Incidentally, the story as filed is stated to be based on Vietnamese sources, and not U.S., in Saigon."

You can get the compelling America's Stolen Narrative with a minimum contribution to Truthout. Just click here

Rostow's cable also summed up the consensus from him, Rusk and Clifford: "The information sources [an apparent reference to the FBI wiretaps] must be protected and not introduced into domestic politics; even with these sources, the case is not open and shut."

Thus, the American electorate went to the polls on Nov. 5 with no knowledge that Johnson's failed peace talks may have been sabotaged by Nixon's campaign. Nixon prevailed over Humphrey by about 500,000 votes or less than one percent of the ballots cast in one of the closest elections in U.S. History.

'Sordid Story'

After Nixon's victory, Johnson tried to get the peace talks back on track. He appealed directly to Nixon in another phone call on Nov. 8 and again raised the implied threat of going public with his growing file on Republican contacts with the South Vietnamese:

"They've been quoting you [Nixon] indirectly, that the thing they ought to do is to just not show up at any [peace] conference and wait until you come into office. Now they've started that [boycott] and that's bad. They're killing Americans every day. I have that [story of the peace-talk sabotage] documented. There's not any question but that's happening. ... That's the story, Dick, and it's a sordid story. ... I don't want to say that to the country, because that's not good."

Faced with Johnson's threat, Nixon promised to tell the South Vietnamese officials to join the peace talks. However, nothing changed. For LBJ, there would be no peace.

As Inauguration Day approached, an embittered President Johnson ordered his national security aide Walt Rostow to remove from the White House the file containing the secret evidence of this "sordid story," a decision that would have its own unintended consequences.

But Johnson did know that the file was no longer at the White House because he had ordered Walt Rostow to remove it in the final days of his own presidency.

[Nixon instructed H.R. Haldeman, his chief of staff, to find and destroy the secret Rostow file on the Nixon campaign efforts to undercut the Paris peace conference. Haldeman had told Nixon that the file was being safeguarded at the Brookings Institute.]

On June 30, 1971, Nixon again berated Haldeman about the need to break into Brookings and "take it [the file] out." Nixon even suggested using former CIA officer E. Howard Hunt (who later oversaw the two Watergate break-ins in May and June of 1972) to conduct the Brookings break-in.

"You talk to Hunt," Nixon told Haldeman. "I want the break-in. Hell, they do that. You're to break into the place, rifle the files, and bring them in. ... Just go in and take it. Go in around 8:00 or 9:00 o'clock."

Haldeman: "Make an inspection of the safe."

Nixon: "That's right. You go in to inspect the safe. I mean, clean it up." For reasons that remain unclear, it appears that the planned Brookings break-in never took place, but Nixon's desperation to locate Johnson's peace-talk file was an important link in the chain of events that led to the creation of Nixon's Plumbers unit and then to Watergate.

The 'X' Envelope

Ironically, Walt Rostow made that link in his own mind when he had to decide what to do with the file in the wake of Johnson's death on Jan. 22, 1973. In the preceding four years, Rostow had come to label the file "The 'X' Envelope," a name that he wrote in longhand on the file's cover.

On May 14, 1973, as he pondered what to do with the file, the Watergate scandal was spinning out of Nixon's control. In a three-page "memorandum for the record," Rostow summarized what was in "The 'X' Envelope" and provided a chronology for the events in fall 1968.

Rostow reflected, too, on what effect LBJ's public silence may have had on the unfolding Watergate scandal. Rostow had a unique perspective in understanding the subterranean background to Nixon's political espionage operations.

"I am inclined to believe the Republican operation in 1968 relates in two ways to the Watergate affair of 1972," Rostow wrote. He noted, first, that Nixon's operatives may have judged that their "enterprise with the South Vietnamese" – in frustrating Johnson's last-ditch peace initiative – had secured Nixon his narrow margin of victory over Hubert Humphrey in 1968.

"Second, they got away with it," Rostow wrote. "Despite considerable press commentary after the election, the matter was never investigated fully. Thus, as the same men faced the election in 1972, there was nothing in their previous experience with an operation of doubtful propriety (or, even, legality) to warn them off, and there were memories of how close an election could get and the possible utility of pressing to the limit – and beyond."

Rostow apparently struggled with this question for the next month as the Watergate scandal continued to expand. On June 25, 1973, fired White House counsel John Dean delivered his blockbuster Senate testimony, claiming that Nixon got involved in the cover-up within days of the June 1972 burglary at the Democratic National Committee. Dean also asserted that Watergate was just part of a years-long program of political espionage directed by Nixon's White House.

The very next day, as headlines of Dean's testimony filled the nation's newspapers, Rostow reached his conclusion about what to do with "The 'X' Envelope." In longhand, he wrote a "Top Secret" note which read, "To be opened by the Director, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, not earlier than fifty (50) years from this date June 26, 1973."

Ultimately, however, the LBJ Library didn't wait that long. After a little more than two decades, on July 22, 1994, the envelope was opened and the archivists began the process of declassifying the contents.

Since the audiotapes from many of Johnson's phone conversations have also been declassified, it is now possible to overlay the information that Johnson had from the FBI wiretaps upon his conversations with Nixon and other principals and thus get a fuller sense of the high-stakes drama.

Lost History

Yet, Rostow's delay in releasing "The 'X' Envelope" had other political consequences. Since the full scope of Nixon's political intelligence operations were not understood in 1973-74, Washington's conventional wisdom adopted the mistaken lesson that "the cover-up is worse than the crime." What wasn't understood was how deep Nixon's villainy may have gone.

You can get the compelling America's Stolen Narrative with a minimum contribution to Truthout. Just click here

Copyright of Robert Parry. May not be reprinted without permission of the author.


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How Richard Nixon Sabotaged 1968 Vietnam Peace Talks to Get Elected President

Friday, 18 January 2013 10:01 By Robert Parry, Truthout | Book Excerpt

(Image: The Media Consortium)(Image: The Media Consortium)Journalist Robert Parry, editor of Consortiumnews.com, may be the most knowledgeable journalist about the GOP use of foreign policy subterfuge (some might call it treason) to successfully win the 1968 and 1980 elections. He has compiled the evidence in his latest book, "America's Stolen Narrative."

It is a persuasive account of the beginning of de facto stolen presidential elections by the GOP, which in turn has led to a lack of accountability for executive branch actions by the DC code of silence among the powerful. These elections (with the exception of Watergate) taught the Republicans, Parry contends, that there would be no consequences for law-breaking behavior in elections and foreign policy.

You can get the compelling America's Stolen Narrative with a minimum contribution to Truthout. Just click here

The following passages from the book explore the 1968 Nixon campaign efforts to prevent peace in Vietnam in order to help him narrowly be elected president.

Possibly the most notorious "October Surprise" case – and the first of this modern era – occurred in fall 1968 when Republican Richard Nixon was locked in a tight presidential race with Democratic nominee, Vice President Hubert Humphrey, and President Johnson was making progress in Vietnam peace negotiations.

At that point, a half million American soldiers were in the war zone and more than 30,000 had already died, along with Vietnamese dead estimated at about one million. In late October 1968, Johnson saw a chance for a breakthrough that would involve a bombing halt of North Vietnam and a possible framework for peace.

However, Johnson encountered surprising resistance from U.S. allies in South Vietnam. President Nguyen van Thieu was suddenly laying down obstacles to a possible settlement in the Paris peace talks.

On Oct. 29, 1968, Johnson got his first clear indication as to why. According to declassified records at the LBJ Library in Austin, Texas, Eugene Rostow, Johnson's Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, got a tip from Wall Street financier Alexander Sachs who said that one of Nixon's closest financial backers was describing Nixon's plan to "block" a peace settlement.

Nixon's backer was sharing this information at a working lunch with his banking colleagues in the context of helping them place their bets on stocks and bonds. In other words, the investment bankers were colluding over how to make money with their inside knowledge of Nixon's scheme to extend the Vietnam War.

Eugene Rostow passed on the information to his brother, Walt W. Rostow, Johnson's national security adviser. Eugene Rostow also wrote a memo about the tip. "The conversation was in the context of a professional discussion about the future of the financial markets in the near term," he wrote. "The speaker said he thought the prospects for a bombing halt or a cease-fire were dim, because Nixon was playing the problem ... to block. ... They would incite Saigon to be difficult, and Hanoi to wait."

In a later memo providing a chronology of the affair, Walt Rostow said he got the news about the Wall Street lunch from his brother shortly before attending a morning meeting at which President Johnson was informed by U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker about "Thieu's sudden intransigence."

You can get the compelling America's Stolen Narrative with a minimum contribution to Truthout. Just click here

Walt Rostow said "the diplomatic information previously received plus the information from New York took on new and serious significance," leading Johnson to order an FBI investigation that soon uncovered the framework of Nixon's blocking operation.

From the FBI wiretaps, Johnson quickly learned about the role of Nixon campaign official (and right-wing China Lobby figure) Anna Chennault contacting South Vietnam's Ambassador to the United States Bui Diem regarding the political importance for President Thieu's continued boycott of the Paris peace talks.

Nixon's 'Treason'

After reading these secret FBI cables, Johnson began working the phones to counter the Nixon campaign's gambit. According to recordings of the phone calls that have since been declassified, Johnson complained to Senate Republican Leader Everett Dirksen about the subterfuge.

On Nov. 2, just three days before the election, an angry Johnson telephoned Dirksen at 9:18 p.m., to provide details about Nixon's activities and to urge Dirksen to intervene forcefully.

"The agent [Chennault] says she's just talked to the boss in New Mexico and that he said that you [South Vietnam] must hold out, just hold on until after the election," Johnson said. "We know what Thieu is saying to them out there. We're pretty well informed at both ends." [Johnson believed "the boss in New Mexico" was Nixon's running mate, Spiro Agnew, who was there on a campaign trip.]

Johnson then injected a thinly veiled threat to go public. "I don't want to get this in the campaign," Johnson said, adding: "They oughtn't be doing this. This is treason."

Dirksen responded, "I know."

Johnson continued: "I think it would shock America if a principal candidate was playing with a source like this on a matter of this importance. I don't want to do that [go public]. They ought to know that we know what they're doing. I know who they're talking to. I know what they're saying."

Dirksen: "I better get in touch with him [Nixon], I think."

"They're contacting a foreign power in the middle of a war," Johnson said. "It's a damn bad mistake. And I don't want to say so. ... You just tell them that their people are messing around in this thing, and if they don't want it on the front pages, they better quit it."

After hearing from Dirksen, Nixon grew concerned that Johnson might just go public with his evidence of the conspiracy. At 1:54 p.m. on Nov. 3, trying to head off that possibility, Nixon spoke directly to Johnson, according to an audiotape released by the LBJ Library.

Nixon: "I just wanted you to know that I got a report from Everett Dirksen with regard to your call. ... I just went on 'Meet the Press' and I said ... that I had given you my personal assurance that I would do everything possible to cooperate both before the election and, if elected, after the election and if you felt ... that anything would be useful that I could do, that I would do it, that I felt Saigon should come to the conference table. ...

"I feel very, very strongly about this. Any rumblings around about somebody trying to sabotage the Saigon government's attitude, there's absolutely no credibility as far as I'm concerned."

Armed with FBI reports and other intelligence, Johnson responded, "I'm very happy to hear that, Dick, because that is taking place. Here's the history of it. I didn't want to call you but I wanted you to know what happened."

Johnson recounted some of the chronology leading up to Oct. 28, 1968, when it appeared that South Vietnam was onboard for the peace talks. He added: "Then the traffic goes out that Nixon will do better by you. Now that goes to Thieu. I didn't say with your knowledge. I hope it wasn't."

"Huh, no," Nixon responded. "My God, I would never do anything to encourage ... Saigon not to come to the table. ... Good God, we want them over to Paris, we got to get them to Paris or you can't have a peace. ... The war apparently now is about where it could be brought to an end. The quicker the better. To hell with the political credit, believe me."

Johnson, however, sounded less than convinced. "You just see that your people don't tell the South Vietnamese that they're going to get a better deal out of the United States government than a conference," the President said.

An Almost Scoop

After the conversation with Nixon, Johnson continued to consider whether he should go public with Nixon's "treason." A last-minute opportunity arose when a Christian Science Monitor correspondent in Saigon, Beverly Deepe, got word from South Vietnamese sources about the pressure on Thieu from the Nixon campaign to block the peace talks.

Deepe's story draft read: "Purported political encouragement from the Richard Nixon camp was a significant factor in the last-minute decision of President Thieu's refusal to send a delegation to the Paris peace talks – at least until the American Presidential election is over."

So, on Nov. 4, journalist Saville Davis from the Monitor's Washington bureau checked out Deepe's story with South Vietnamese Ambassador Bui Diem and with the White House. Bui Diem knocked the story down and the decision by the White House on whether to confirm the story went to President Johnson himself.

In a conference call, Johnson consulted with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Defense Secretary Clark Clifford and Walt Rostow. All three advisers recommended against going public, mostly out of fear that the scandalous information might reflect badly on the U.S. Government.

"Some elements of the story are so shocking in their nature that I'm wondering whether it would be good for the country to disclose the story and then possibly have a certain individual [Nixon] elected," Clifford said. "It could cast his whole administration under such doubt that I think it would be inimical to our country's interests."

Johnson concurred with the judgment, and an administration spokesman told Davis, "Obviously I'm not going to get into this kind of thing in any way, shape or form," according to an "eyes only" cable that Rostow sent Johnson. The cable added:

"Saville Davis volunteered that his newspaper would certainly not print the story in the form in which it was filed; but they might print a story which said Thieu, on his own, decided to hold out until after the election. Incidentally, the story as filed is stated to be based on Vietnamese sources, and not U.S., in Saigon."

You can get the compelling America's Stolen Narrative with a minimum contribution to Truthout. Just click here

Rostow's cable also summed up the consensus from him, Rusk and Clifford: "The information sources [an apparent reference to the FBI wiretaps] must be protected and not introduced into domestic politics; even with these sources, the case is not open and shut."

Thus, the American electorate went to the polls on Nov. 5 with no knowledge that Johnson's failed peace talks may have been sabotaged by Nixon's campaign. Nixon prevailed over Humphrey by about 500,000 votes or less than one percent of the ballots cast in one of the closest elections in U.S. History.

'Sordid Story'

After Nixon's victory, Johnson tried to get the peace talks back on track. He appealed directly to Nixon in another phone call on Nov. 8 and again raised the implied threat of going public with his growing file on Republican contacts with the South Vietnamese:

"They've been quoting you [Nixon] indirectly, that the thing they ought to do is to just not show up at any [peace] conference and wait until you come into office. Now they've started that [boycott] and that's bad. They're killing Americans every day. I have that [story of the peace-talk sabotage] documented. There's not any question but that's happening. ... That's the story, Dick, and it's a sordid story. ... I don't want to say that to the country, because that's not good."

Faced with Johnson's threat, Nixon promised to tell the South Vietnamese officials to join the peace talks. However, nothing changed. For LBJ, there would be no peace.

As Inauguration Day approached, an embittered President Johnson ordered his national security aide Walt Rostow to remove from the White House the file containing the secret evidence of this "sordid story," a decision that would have its own unintended consequences.

But Johnson did know that the file was no longer at the White House because he had ordered Walt Rostow to remove it in the final days of his own presidency.

[Nixon instructed H.R. Haldeman, his chief of staff, to find and destroy the secret Rostow file on the Nixon campaign efforts to undercut the Paris peace conference. Haldeman had told Nixon that the file was being safeguarded at the Brookings Institute.]

On June 30, 1971, Nixon again berated Haldeman about the need to break into Brookings and "take it [the file] out." Nixon even suggested using former CIA officer E. Howard Hunt (who later oversaw the two Watergate break-ins in May and June of 1972) to conduct the Brookings break-in.

"You talk to Hunt," Nixon told Haldeman. "I want the break-in. Hell, they do that. You're to break into the place, rifle the files, and bring them in. ... Just go in and take it. Go in around 8:00 or 9:00 o'clock."

Haldeman: "Make an inspection of the safe."

Nixon: "That's right. You go in to inspect the safe. I mean, clean it up." For reasons that remain unclear, it appears that the planned Brookings break-in never took place, but Nixon's desperation to locate Johnson's peace-talk file was an important link in the chain of events that led to the creation of Nixon's Plumbers unit and then to Watergate.

The 'X' Envelope

Ironically, Walt Rostow made that link in his own mind when he had to decide what to do with the file in the wake of Johnson's death on Jan. 22, 1973. In the preceding four years, Rostow had come to label the file "The 'X' Envelope," a name that he wrote in longhand on the file's cover.

On May 14, 1973, as he pondered what to do with the file, the Watergate scandal was spinning out of Nixon's control. In a three-page "memorandum for the record," Rostow summarized what was in "The 'X' Envelope" and provided a chronology for the events in fall 1968.

Rostow reflected, too, on what effect LBJ's public silence may have had on the unfolding Watergate scandal. Rostow had a unique perspective in understanding the subterranean background to Nixon's political espionage operations.

"I am inclined to believe the Republican operation in 1968 relates in two ways to the Watergate affair of 1972," Rostow wrote. He noted, first, that Nixon's operatives may have judged that their "enterprise with the South Vietnamese" – in frustrating Johnson's last-ditch peace initiative – had secured Nixon his narrow margin of victory over Hubert Humphrey in 1968.

"Second, they got away with it," Rostow wrote. "Despite considerable press commentary after the election, the matter was never investigated fully. Thus, as the same men faced the election in 1972, there was nothing in their previous experience with an operation of doubtful propriety (or, even, legality) to warn them off, and there were memories of how close an election could get and the possible utility of pressing to the limit – and beyond."

Rostow apparently struggled with this question for the next month as the Watergate scandal continued to expand. On June 25, 1973, fired White House counsel John Dean delivered his blockbuster Senate testimony, claiming that Nixon got involved in the cover-up within days of the June 1972 burglary at the Democratic National Committee. Dean also asserted that Watergate was just part of a years-long program of political espionage directed by Nixon's White House.

The very next day, as headlines of Dean's testimony filled the nation's newspapers, Rostow reached his conclusion about what to do with "The 'X' Envelope." In longhand, he wrote a "Top Secret" note which read, "To be opened by the Director, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, not earlier than fifty (50) years from this date June 26, 1973."

Ultimately, however, the LBJ Library didn't wait that long. After a little more than two decades, on July 22, 1994, the envelope was opened and the archivists began the process of declassifying the contents.

Since the audiotapes from many of Johnson's phone conversations have also been declassified, it is now possible to overlay the information that Johnson had from the FBI wiretaps upon his conversations with Nixon and other principals and thus get a fuller sense of the high-stakes drama.

Lost History

Yet, Rostow's delay in releasing "The 'X' Envelope" had other political consequences. Since the full scope of Nixon's political intelligence operations were not understood in 1973-74, Washington's conventional wisdom adopted the mistaken lesson that "the cover-up is worse than the crime." What wasn't understood was how deep Nixon's villainy may have gone.

You can get the compelling America's Stolen Narrative with a minimum contribution to Truthout. Just click here

Copyright of Robert Parry. May not be reprinted without permission of the author.


Hide Comments

blog comments powered by Disqus